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The Hazardous Chemicals Right-to-Know Act: Letting the
Public Know What's Next Door
Public attention has recently focused on the presence of hazardous chemi-
cals in industries and businesses. The December 1984 tragedy in Bhopal, India,
in which a leak of methyl isocynate gas caused at least two thousand deaths and
thousands of injuries, demonstrates the disastrous results that may occur when
hazardous chemicals are released in an unsuspecting community.' The United
States has had its share of toxic mishaps as well. A recent study indicates that at
least 6928 accidents involving toxic chemicals have occurred during the last five
years, killing more than 135 people, injuring nearly 1500, and forcing the evacu-
ation of at least 217,457.2
North Carolina has not escaped from problems associated with the release
of hazardous chemicals into the environment. A 1982 fire at the Baxter-Harris
warehouse in Charlotte ignited chemicals and produced a "cloud of poisonous
smoke" that forced 1300 people to evacuate.3 Hundreds of East Durham resi-
dents were evacuated from their homes in 1983 when a cloud of butyl acetate
was released into the atmosphere from a nearby chemical recycling plant.4 In
1. Elmer-Dewitt, What Happened at Bhopal, TIME, Apr. 1, 1985, at 71; Work, Inside Story of
Union Carbide's India Nightmare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 21, 1985, at 51.
2. Diamond, Toxic Chemicals Spilled at 5-a-Day Rate-Study, Durham Morning Herald, Oct.
3, 1985, at 1A, col. 2. The study, which the Environmental Protection Agency commissioned in
response to the Bhopal incident, included a partial list of toxic spills occurring in the United States
since 1980. The draft of the report, dated September 1985, states that the spills and emissions occur-
ring in the last 5 years averaged 5 per day, totaling 420 million pounds of chemicals. One of the
study's consultants estimated that the actual number of spills in the United States was two and one-
half to three times higher than that reported. Id.
Toxic discharges and emissions affecting communities have been frequent. Institute and South
Charleston, West Virginia, for example, have recently gained notoriety for chemical emissions from
Union Carbide facilities located in those communities. See Taylor, Chemical Leaks Show Holes in
US. Safeguards, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 26, 1985, at 32. A leak of a highly poisonous
carcinogen and a pesticide ingredient resulted in 149 Institute residents seeking medical treatment.
Two days later 1000 gallons of sulfuric acid and brake fluid components were accidently discharged
from a Union Carbide plant in nearby South Charleston. Id. Similar incidents have occurred na-
tionwide. See, eg., id. (fire and fumes from derailed train forced 250 residents of three rural Arizona
towns to evacuate; forklift accident at a New Jersey dye plant resulted in the release of 3000 gallons
of toxic oil into city's sewers forcing 100 families to evacuate; 5000 gallons of rocket fuel and corro-
sive waste leak from a tank trunk forced 300 families of a Virginia suburb to flee; leaking nitric acid
at a Metuchen, New Jersey, chemical plant forced 1000 plant workers and residents to evacuate);
Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 5, 1985, at A9, col. 3 (2000 people evacuated and classes cancelled
at four nearby schools when hydrochloric acid leaked from a galvanizing plant at Canton, Ohio);
Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 3, 1985, at A2, col. 6 (fumes from chemical warehouse fire forced
300 residents to evacuate, sending 14 persons to the hospital).
3. Morrill, Right-to-Know Law May Void Stronger Local Fire Rules, The Charlotte Observer,
Aug. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 1. In 1959 an explosion at a chemical plant injured 13 firemen when water
from fire hoses came in contact with metallic sodium which reacts violently with water. The unsus-
pecting firemen were unaware of the sodium's presence. Id. Consequently, Charlotte adopted an
ordinance requiring the identification of hazardous substances and later adopted other regulations,
apparently providing Charlotte with North Carolina's first right-to-know law. See id.; infra notes
105-109 and accompanying text.
4. Morrill, supra note 3; see Jeffries, Investigators Hope to Discover Why Fumes Overcame Pro-
tected Officers, The News and Observer, (Raleigh, N.C.) Mar. 12, 1983, at Cl, col. 1; Jeffries, Toxic
Vapor Released at Durham Company, The News and Observer, (Raleigh, N.C.) Mar. 11, 1983, at
Dl, col. 5. A punctured chemical drum at Armageddon Chemical Company leaked butyl acetate
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response to incidents such as these, the North Carolina General Assembly en-
acted the Hazardous Chemicals Right to Know Act (the Right-to-Know Act) in
July 1985.5 The Right-to-Know Act provides emergency personnel, health care
professionals, and the general public access to information about hazardous
chemicals used or stored by North Carolina employers.
This Note examines the public's newly acquired right-to-know. It discusses
the public's right prior to the enactment of the Right-to-Know Act,6 considers
how the Act alters current public access to hazardous chemical information, and
analyzes the Act's potential problem areas. The Note concludes that the Right-
to-Know Act represents a balance between the public's need for hazardous
chemical information and the employer's right to protect confidential business
information. By allowing public access to this information, the Act is a step in
the right direction. However, to help the general public understand and prepare
adequately for the risks and consequences of hazardous chemical leaks, the Act
should be amended to allow greater public access to information about hazard-
ous chemical emissions and discharges.
Prior to the Right-to-Know Act no statewide legislation gave the public
broad access to information about hazardous chemicals stored, used, or pro-
duced by employers. Only certain members of the community, namely employ-
ees of the facilities themselves and firefighters, had access to such information.
Fire officials in North Carolina have the right to obtain limited knowledge
concerning hazardous chemicals under local fire codes, which generally are
based on either the National Fire Protection Association or the American Insur-
ance Association national fire codes.7 These codes contain provisions that pro-
and a cloud of the chemical drifted into the surrounding neighborhood. Ambulance personnel at the
scene reported that the concentration of butyl acetate, was high enough to damage lungs. Id. This
incident sparked community interest in the right-to-know concept. Durham subsequently enacted a
local right-to-know bill. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
5. Hazardous Chemicals Right to Know Act, ch. 775, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 869 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-173 to -218 (1985)).
The impetus behind right-to-know legislation has been succinctly stated by one federal court:
Since World War II the number of available chemicals has grown extraordinarily, there
being approximately 50,000 different chemicals used in industry. Many of these are haz-
ardous. Exposure to these hazardous substances can take place in the plant where they are
used or processed; the community can be exposed through emission in the air, through
accidental leakage from the plant or through lawful and unlawful disposal outside the
plant. Exposure can and does result in debilitating or fatal illness, particularly cancer, lung
ailments, sterility and birth defects.
[C]ommunities surrounding industrial complexes do not know the nature of chemical
vapor to which they are exposed nor do they know the possible hazards which exposure
entails. Public health officials cannot advise them because they, too, quite often do not
have the necessary information. While some industrial concerns go to great pains to edu-
cate and inform both their employees and public officials of the chemical substances in
their plants, others do not. Lacking such cooperation there was little that public officials
could do to protect citizens from the existence of harmful substances.
N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 609-10 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
6. The Right-to-Know Act became effective May 25, 1986. Hazardous Chemicals Right to
Know Act, ch. 775, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 869, 877.
7. The National Fire Prevention Association and the American Insurance Association have
produced extensive fire codes. Most cities, towns, and villages adopt one of these codes as a basis for
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vide fire officials with the authority to inspect premises for "the purpose of
ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, [or]
endanger life from fire." 8
Furthermore, both fire codes provide procedures that deal specifically with
hazardous chemicals.9 These procedures, however, deal with hazardous chemi-
cals only from a "fire hazard" or "firefighting" perspective. Those who use,
store, or produce highly toxic material are required to take special precau-
tions. 10 Permits must be obtained from local fire departments for the storage or
handling of designated amounts of hazardous substances and for any amount of
"highly toxic material or poisonous gas."" A "highly toxic material," however,
is narrowly defined as a material "so toxic to man as to afford an unusual hazard
to life and health during fire fighting operations."12 Therefore, a substance that
does not create an unusual hazard during firefighting operations although posing
a great hazard in other settings or circumstances, such as an accidental leakage,
would not qualify as a highly toxic material and would not require a permit or
special storage. The Right-to-Know Act substantially increases fire department
officials' access to hazardous chemical information.13
Employees also have been entitled to information regarding the hazardous
substances with which they work.14 In accordance with the federal Occupa-
their local code. Interview with Joseph Robertson, Fire Marshall of Chapel Hill, N.C., in Chapel
Hill (Sept. 18, 1985).
8. FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 1.4.a (Am. Ins. Ass'n 1976). Similar authority is provided by
the other major code. See NFPA FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 1-3.4.1 (Nat'l Fire Protection Ass'n
Inc. 1982).
9. See FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 20.1 to -.15 (Am. Ins. Ass'n 1976); NFPA FIRE PREVEN-
TION CODE § 3-9 (Nat'l Fire Protection Ass'n Inc. 1982).
10. Such materials must be separated from other chemicals. FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 20.11
(Am. Ins. Ass'n 1976). Combustible and flammable substances must be stored in a room or com-
partment that is separated from all other areas and that has a high fire resistance. Id. Warning signs
posted at such areas stating the nature and the location of the materials also are required. Id.
11. Id. § 20.3.a (permit required for storage or handling of 55 gallons or more of corrosive
liquids, 50 pounds or more of oxidizing materials, 10 pounds or more of organic peroxides, 500
pounds or more of nitromethane, 1000 pounds or more of ammonium nitrate including fertilizers,
and any amount of poisonous gas).
Before a fire official authorizes the issuance of a permit, the applicant may be required to submit
in writing reports from an approved laboratory designating the physical and chemical properties of
the substances on the permit and evidence that the proposed practices are in accordance with nation-
ally recognized practices. Id. § 20.3.c. In addition, the permittee may have to certify that no undue
hazard to life or property is posed by the chemicals and submit a statement regarding the qualifica-
tions, experience, and knowledge of the supervisor of the operations that use the material. Id. Per-
mits must be kept on the facility's premises for police or fire department inspection. Id. § 1.9.d.
12. Id. § 20.2.c.
13. See infra note 51.
14. The North Carolina standard governing such disclosure now includes all North Carolina
employers and employees with these exceptions: Domestic workers; persons in farming operations
with ten or fewer employees, excluding operations that maintain labor camps; federal government
employees; employees protected by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and amendments, by the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, and by the Federal
Safety Appliance Act; and employees engaged in maritime operations. N.C. Dep't of Labor, North
Carolina Department of Labor Changes to the Hazard Communication Standard [13 NCAC
7C.0101(a)(99)] Statement 1-2 (June 27, 1985). Employees covered by the standard include all
"worker[s] employed by an employer in a workplace... who may be exposed to hazardous chemi-
cals under normal operating conditions or foreseeable emergencies, including but not limited to pro-
duction workers, line supervisors, and repair or maintenance personnel." Id. at 6. Employers are
[Vol. 641332
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tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,15 North Carolina has an approved state
plan that vests administrative and enforcement authority for all matters relating
to occupational safety and health in the North Carolina Department of Labor.1 6
The North Carolina Commissioner of Labor must adopt and promulgate occu-
pational safety and health rules 17 which, under conditions for state approval,
must be at least as effective as the counterpart federal standards.18 Conse-
quently, on February 1, 1984, North Carolina adopted by reference the federal
Hazard Communication Standard,1 9 which requires that chemical manufactur-
ers and importers evaluate chemicals and communicate any hazards associated
with the chemicals to employers and employees in the manufacturing sector.20
Currently, North Carolina requires employers to
maintain accurate records of employee exposure to potentially toxic
materials [or] harmful physical agents which are required to be moni-
tored or measured [and] provide employees or their representatives
with an opportunity to observe such monitoring or measuring, and to
have access to the records thereof .... [E]ach employee [shall] have
access to such records as will indicate his own exposure to toxic mater-
ials .... Each employer shall promptly notify any employee who has
been or is being exposed to toxic materials ... at levels which exceed
those prescribed by an applicable safety and health standard... and
defined under the standard as persons engaged in a business, or a governmental unit, in which chemi-
cals are either used or produced for use or distribution. Id.
The date when employers must comply with the standard varies according to the type of em-
ployer and the particular requirements of the standard. Chemical manufacturers and importers now
must label containers of hazardous chemicals leaving the facility, and they must provide material
safety data sheets with their shipments. Id. at 8. Distributors now must be in compliance with all
provisions of the standard. Id. Manufacturing employers listed in Standard Industrial Code Nos.
20-39 and state and local governments must comply by May 25, 1986, while all other employers
must comply by May 25, 1987. Id.
15. Occupational Safety and Health Act of December 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (1970-1971) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1982)).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a), (b), (c)(2) (1982). States have the power to assume responsibility
for the development and enforcement of standards provided that state standards are as effective as
federal standards. Id. § 667(c)(2). When applicable to products distributed or used in interstate
commerce, such standards must be required by "compelling local conditions" and cannot "unduly
burden interstate commerce." Id.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-131 (1985).
18. See supra note 16. When a new federal standard is promulgated by the United States Secre-
tary of Labor, the standard is automatically adopted in North Carolina unless the Commissioner of
Labor promulgates a State standard as effective as the federal counterpart. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
131(a) (1985).
19. N.C. Dep't of Labor, North Carolina Department of Labor Changes to the Hazard Com-
munications Standard [13 NCAC 7C.0101(a)(99)] Statement (June 27, 1985). Commissioner of
Labor John C. Brooks amended the adopted standard on June 27, 1985, with the effective date of
June 27, 1985. Id. at 1.
20. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1985). The standard requires that containers of hazardous
chemicals be labelled and that health, safety, and hazard information, as well as a training program
for employees, be provided. Id. § 1910.1200(a)(1). The standard also provides employers with the
opportunity to claim trade secret protection and thereby withhold from employees access to infor-
mation including the specific identity of protected chemicals. Id. § 1910.1200(i). Such information
is available to health care professionals treating the employees and to the assistant secretary. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that denying access to em-
ployees and their collective bargaining representatives was unwarranted, however, and instructed the
Secretary of Labor to review the restriction. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728,
742-43 (3d Cir. 1985).
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shall inform any employee who is being thus exposed of the corrective
action being taken. 21
Employees, like firefighters, therefore had a right to obtain hazardous chemical
information prior to the enactment of the Right-to-Know Act.
Before the passage of the Right-to-Know Act the general public had to rely
on limited and inconvenient methods to determine what chemicals were present
at nearby businesses and to obtain health and safety information concerning
these chemicals. First, the public could use the North Carolina public records
statute22 to obtain information that the chemical users, producers, or storers
provided to the appropriate state agencies. 23 Second, the public could attempt
to receive information about the chemicals at a particular facility from the em-
ployer, employees, or health professionals treating employees. Last, the public
could obtain hazardous chemical information pursuant to the discovery process
in preparation for a trial or hearing.24 These measures, however, have disadvan-
tages that have severely limited their effectiveness.
Facilities give hazardous chemicals information to state agencies pursuant
to state law. For example, under North Carolina's environmental laws, "per-
sons" 25 are generally required to obtain permits from the Environmental Man-
agement Commission (EMC)2 6 before they can emit or discharge substances
into the air or water in contravention of a standard or limitation established for
that particular source of emission or discharge. 27 The EMC must be provided a
report "setting forth the volume and characteristics of wastes discharged or air
contaminants emitted daily or such other period of time as may be specified." '28
Discharges, emissions, and subsequent effects on the environment also must be
monitored and reported to the EMC.29 In addition, EMC personnel have the
authority to conduct investigations of facilities and require reports or statements
regarding air or water pollution sources.30 Such investigations usually result in
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-143(c) (1985).
22. Id. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1981).
23. See generally Comment, Public Access to Government-held Records: A Neglected Right in
North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1187 (1977) (analysis of public records statute); Note, Public Access
to Public Records in North Carolina: The Key to Good Government, 60 N.C.L. REV. 853 (1982)
(analysis of public records statute in context of several state agencies and their access policies).
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26 (Supp, 1985). "Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action
." Id. § lA-1, Rule 26(b)(1).
25. A person is defined as an individual, firm, partnership, association, public or private institu-
tion, municipality, political subdivision, government agency, or private or public corporation. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-290(12), 143-213(14), 143-215.77(13) (1983 & Supp. 1985).
26. The EMC, in conjunction with the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and
Community Development, was established to "administer federally mandated programs of environ-
mental management and to qualify to accept and administer funds from the federal government for
such programs." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (1983). Consequently, the EMC has the "power and
duty to promulgate rules and regulations to be followed in the protection, preservation, and enhance-
ment of the water and air resources of the State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-282 (1983 & Supp.
1985). For a description of the powers of the EMC, see id. For a description of the composition of
the EMC, see id. § 143B-283.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.1, .108 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
28. Id. § 143-215.65 (1983).
29. Id. § 143-215.66.
30. Id. § 143-215.3(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 641334
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the EMC investigator filing a report as well. All the permits, records, and re-
ports required by the EMC probably qualify as public records and thus should
be available for public inspection.31 Presumably, an individual could discover
characteristics about a facility's discharges and emissions through use of these
records.
The public's access to this information under the public records statute,
however, is limited in several ways. First, if the facility can show that disclosure
of records, reports, information, or any particular part thereof, other than efflu-
ent or emission data, would divulge methods or processes entitled to trade secret
protection, the information would not be released to the public.32 Second, all
information gathered by the EMC must be related to effluent or emission limita-
tions or standards.33 Thus, if no effluent, water quality, or emission standards
governed a particular chemical, its discharge or emission would not have to be
reported. Third, a facility obtains a permit only for those discharges and emis-
sions it intends to make. Therefore, numerous hazardous chemicals on-site may
not be mentioned in the permit even though they could be released accidently
into the environment. Also, the public's ability to inspect a permit usually
would not provide hazard and safety information regarding these substances.
Similar limitations exist if the public attempts to examine EMC records and
reports regarding a facility's compliance with the Oil Pollution and Hazardous
Substances Control Act,34 the Department of Human Resources' records and
reports submitted by facilities in accordance with solid waste management re-
quirements,35 or information submitted by facilities to various federal agencies
under the Freedom of Information Act.36
31. See id §§ 132-1, -6 (1981). All "documents, papers, letters ... or other documentary mate-
rial, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in
connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of North Carolina government" are
public records. Id. § 132-1.
32. "Any records, reports or information obtained... shall be available to the public except
that upon a showing satisfactory to the Environmental Management Commission by any person that
records, reports or information or particular part thereof (other than effluent or emission data)... if
made public would divulge methods or process entitled to protection as trade secrets." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-215.3 (a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1985). Information that qualifies as a trade secret is also entitled
to protection under the Right-to-Know Act. See infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1985).
34. This environmental law provides that the EMC can investigate discharges of oil or hazard-
ous substances into water or on land in close proximity to water. IaL §§ 143-215.77(4), -.79 (1983).
Presumably, any reports or records made as a result of these investigations would be available for
public inspection. These reports, however, are subject to confidential business information status
that may render them inaccessible to the general public if related to a secret process, device, or
method of manufacture. Id. § 143-215.80. Furthermore, even if these reports could be accessed,
while they would be helpful in ascertaining substances discharges, they would not disclose identity of
all on-site chemicals. In addition, the quantity of the chemical discharged must reach a threshold
level before the EMC can act, and the statute provides numerous exceptions to its coveratge. See id.
§ 143-215.7(4).
35. Solid waste management facilities must obtain an operating permit from the Department of
Human Resources (DHR). Id. § 130A-294(4) (Supp. 1985). Such permits require identification and
listing of hazardous wastes and ground and surface water monitoring. 10 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 10G.0300, .0600 (1985). Although such records submitted to DHR could be accessed via the
public records statute, all confidential business information is excluded from public disclosure. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-304 (Supp. 1985) (broad definition of confidential business information).
36. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.100-.309 (1985) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's pol-
icy of disclosure under various environmental laws); NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
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The public also may acquire information through fire department records
that qualify as public records. Fire codes generally permit public inspection of
fire department reports on fires that occur at facilities storing or using hazardous
chemicals. 37 The information contained in these reports, however, may be lim-
ited. These reports are compiled after a fire occurs; for planning purposes, the
public needs to be aware of chemicals that pose health and safety risks before a
fire occurs. In addition, fire reports may include information concerning only
those chemicals involved in the fire. Public examination of permit applications
completed by facilities for storage of chemicals could provide additional, albeit
limited, information concerning what chemicals are present and, health and
safety data.3 8 No language in the fire codes, however, specifically authorizes
public inspection, and an employer's claim of confidentiality or trade secret
would foreclose any possible public inspection of the permit or information sub-
mitted to the fire chief.39
In addition to problems likely to be encountered in accessing data from
environmental and fire records, any attempt to use the North Carolina Public
Records Act to obtain information concerning hazardous chemicals would have
several drawbacks. The person desiring to inspect such records usually must
travel to the location where the records are stored. Also, the inspection is con-
ducted under supervision and only during business hours.40 In addition, an
agency may not have compiled the desired type of record. For example,
although the North Carolina Department of Labor requires employers to pro-
vide employees access to information regarding exposure to toxic materials, the
Department itself never has compiled a record containing such information for
public inspection. 41
Another method traditionally available to the public in attempting to ob-
tain information about hazardous chemicals at a particular facility is through
inquiries directed to the employer, employees, or health care providers. In the
absence of any statutory requirements compelling disclosure, however, the em-
ployer is under little obligation to divulge such information. 42 Employees might
COMMISsIoN, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES LABELLING AND IDENTIFICATION, REPORT TO THE 1985
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, at E31-E42 (1985) (a description of information re-
lated to chemicals that is collected by pertinent federal agencies) [hereinafter cited as NORTH CARO-
LINA RESEARCH COMMISSION]; LATOVICK, Protection for Trade Secrets under the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 329 (1980) (discussion of EPA's disclosure of informa-
tion submitted under the Toxic Substances Control Act); McFarity and Shapiro, The Trade Secret
Status of Health Safety Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REv. 837
(1980) (discussion of determination of what data should be publically disclosed by the Food and
Drug Administration and by the EPA under the Freedom of Information Act).
37. See FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 1.8 (Am. Ins. Ass'n 1976).
38. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
39. See FIRE PREVENTION CODE § 20.3.c (Am. Ins. Ass'n 1976) (reports concerning chemicals
or processes may be limited to the confidential use of the fire chief).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1981). "Every person having custody of public records shall
permit them to be inspected and examined at reasonable times and under his supervision." Id.
41. Interview with Charles Jeffress, N.C. Assistant Commissioner of Labor, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Sept. 25, 1985).
42. In response to the publicity created by toxic chemical leaks and spills, however, industry
has been more willing to disclose information about hazardous chemicals and health and safety data
to the public. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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not disclose information about hazardous chemical conditions because they fear
employer retaliation or an employer action against the employee for misappro-
priation of a trade secret. 43 In addition, the employee might be bound by a
confidentiality agreement with his or her employer not to disclose such informa-
tion. These agreements, generally seen in the context of covenants not to com-
pete, consistently have been upheld by the courts.44
An attempt by the public to obtain information from a health care provider
who treats facility employees also becomes problematic. An employer can re-
quire that the health care provider agree in writing not to disclose information
that constitutes a trade secret.45 Furthermore, a health care provider, like an
employee, can be liable for misappropriation of a trade secret.4 6 Therefore, con-
fidentiality agreements and possible penalties for misappropriation decrease the
health care provider's willingness to disclose information to the public.
Finally, a member of the public is entitled to information regarding toxic
chemicals, including specific identification of hazardous chemicals, if he or she
has filed suit against a particular facility. Such information can be obtained
through the discovery process 47 if relevant to the trial.4 8 The court may limit
the scope of available information, however, by issuing protective orders that
preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets.49 Furthermore, the use of discovery
43. See Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., 158 F. Supp. 57 (M.D.N.C. 1958) (former em-
ployee abused confidential relationship with employer by disclosing a trade secret); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-153 (1985) (providing employer with misappropriation action against employee who discloses
trade secret information).
44. See, eg., Harwell Enterprise v. Heim, 276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970) (granting in-
junctive relief to prevent former employee from disclosing trade secrets); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C.
154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) (covenant not to compete made to protect trade secrets upheld); Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 228 S.E.2d 478 (1976) (employee has duty not to
disclose trade secrets and confidential information); Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C.
App. 678, 220 S.E.2d 190 (1975) (covenant not to compete valid); cf. Wilmer, Inc. v. Liles, 13
N.C.App. 71, 185 S.E.2d 278 (1971) (lack of employee's access to trade secrets was a factor in
court's refusal to uphold a covenant not to compete), disc. review denied, 280 N.C. 305, 186 S.E.2d
178 (1972). See generally A. VALIULIS, COVENANTS Nor TO COMPETE: FORMS, TACTICS, AND
THE LAW 372 (1985) (listing North Carolina cases); Note, Injunctive Russian Roulette and Employ-
ment Noncompetition Cases: A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McCure, 63 N.C.L. REv. 222 (1984) (exam-
ining North Carolina case law upholding covenants not to compete).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i)(3), (4) (1985). "The health professional and the employer...
[may] agree in a written confidentiality agreement that the health professional will not use the trade
secret information for any purpose other than health need(s) asserted and agree not to release the
information .... Id. § 1910.1200(i)(3)(v). Also, "the confidentiality agreement... may restrict the
use of the information to the health purposes indicated... [and] may provide for appropriate legal
remedies in the event of a breach of the agreement, including stipulation of a reasonable pre-estimate
of likely damages." Id. § 1910.1200(i)(4)(i), (ii). Such confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements
have been upheld. See, eg., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 742-43 (3d Cir.
1985).
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-1522 (1985) (broad definition of "person" for trade secret liabil-
ity purposes); infra note 52.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 26(a) (Supp. 1985) (methods of discovery).
48. See, eg., Carvel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 284, 291,431 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614-15 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979) (disclosure of trade secrets is permitted during trial if essential to ascertain the truth);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 26(b)(1) (Supp. 1985).
49. See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 26 N.C. App. 414, 216 S.E.2d 379 (advocating
protection of trade secrets in pre-trial discovery process), disc. review denied, 288 N.C. 242, 217
S.E.2d 679 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26 (1983).
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to obtain access to specific chemical information is undesirable due to the ex-
pense of litigation and time considerations.
With the enactment of the Right-to-Know Act, the North Carolina General
Assembly responded to these problems of public access and to growing public
concern about the possibility of toxic chemical accidents and the long term ef-
fects of exposure to low levels of toxic substances. The general assembly ratified
the Act on July 17, 1985, after negotiations and compromise between the State
Senate and House of Representatives.5 0 The Act provides three groups with
access to pertinent health and safety information from a facility using hazardous
chemicals. These three groups are fire chiefs or fire marshalls,51 health care
providers, 52 and the general public. 53 The Right-to-Know Act, however, pre-
vents the public from acquiring information directly from the fire chief, the fire
marshall, other public safety officials, or from health care providers without the
employer's permission.54 The scope of the Act, the kind of information that will
50. Hazardous Chemicals Right to Know Act, ch. 775, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 869, 877
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-173 to -218 (1985)). Some state officials wanted to limit public
disclosure to information given by police and fire departments in emergency situations. See The
News & Observer, (Raleigh, N.C.) July 12, 1985, at A12, col. 1. (North Carolina Governor James
Martin, a former chemistry professor, spoke against the right-to-know proposals, claiming they were
the product of a "small group of people who want to create a chemophobia."). Two days before the
vote House and Senate members were deadlocked; the Senate demanded preemption of local ordi-
nances, disclosure of information to fire departments only if requested by the departments, and dis-
closure to the public only if the person requesting access provided his or her name and promised in
writing to use the information only for the purposes agreed upon. See id. July 13, 1985, at A8, col. 1.
Compromises were reached, however, and the bill was approved in the House 101 to 8 and 43 to 0 in
the Senate. See id. July 16, 1985, at PI, col. 1.
51. The Right-to-Know Act requires an employer using or storing hazardous chemicals to pro-
vide to the local fire chief the name and phone number of a company representative to be contacted
in case of emergency. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-194(a) (1985). If the municipality has a population
greater than 10,000, the employer must provide the fire chief with a Hazardous Substances List
(HSL); if the population is less than 10,000, the employer must inform the chief of the availability of
the HSL. Updates are required as necessary. Id. § 95-194(a), (b). Furthermore, the fire chief may
obtain a Material Safety Data Sheet for any chemical on the HSL, id. § 95-194(d), and may conduct
on-site inspections upon request. Id. § 95-194(c).
If the fire chief so requests, the employer also must provide an emergency response plan detail-
ing evacuation and emergency procedures in the event of hazardous chemical emission or discharge.
Id. § 95-194(e). If the employer submits such a plan, the fire chief must hold the plan in confidence;
unpermitted disclosure is punishable as a misdemeanor. Id. § 95-194(f), (g). The emergency re-
sponse plan or any portion thereof can be disclosed only to personnel responsible for preplanning
emergency response, police, medical, or fire activities. Id. § 95-194(f). The Right-to-Know Act does
not provide the public with the right to participate in the development of the plan or preplanning
activities.
52. In emergency situations in which the specific chemical identity is necessary for emergency
treatment, the employer must disclose such information to the treating health care provider. Id.
§ 95-198(a). As soon as circumstances permit, the employer can require that the provider sign a
confidentiality agreement. Id. In nonemergency situations, if the health care professional provides
in writing to the employer a statement of medical need for chemical information entitled to trade
secret protection, the employer must provide the information and can require that the health care
provider first sign a confidentiality agreement. Id. § 95-198(b).
53. On written request to an employer, any person, after identification and a statement of pur-
pose for the request, is entitled to a list of all the chemicals on the Hazardous Substances List being
used or stored by the employer, the approximate amount of each chemical present, and a Material
Safety Data Sheet for each chemical if requested. Id. § 95-208(a). The employer can refuse access
by claiming trade secret protection. Id. § 95-197; see infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
Such a claim can be adjudicated by the Commissioner of Labor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-208(b)
(1985).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-194(f), -194(g), -197(a), -197(b) (1985). The public thus cannot use
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be available to the public, the limits placed on access to information (including
prescribed penalties for access beyond these limits), and the mechanisms pro-
vided for enforcement are of particular importance.
The public's access to information depends on the scope of the Right-to-
Know Act. The greater the scope of facilities and hazardous substances covered
by the Act, the greater the potential for public access. Chemical manufacturers
and distributors are covered by the Act,55 as are most employers.5 6 The Act
defines an "employer" as a person engaged in business who has employees, in-
cluding the State and its political subdivisions.5 7 The definition excludes an in-
dividual whose employees are domestic workers or casual laborers hired to work
at the individual's residence, retail food or trade establishments, 58 laboratories,
and farming operations employing ten or fewer full-time employees. 59
The public's access to information is also greatly influenced by the Act's
definition of a "hazardous chemical" as "any element, chemical compound or
mixture of elements and/or compounds which is a physical hazard or health
hazard."' 60 Two requirements determine whether a particular chemical repre-
sents a physical or health hazard. First, if scientific tests show that the chemical
possesses certain toxic properties, it will fall within the Act's coverage. 61 Sec-
ond, if the chemical appears in certain established lists of hazardous chemicals,
it will be classified automatically as hazardous. 62 Thus, the Act's designation
can be described as a performance standard: all chemicals meeting the func-
a backdoor approach to obtain information; it must rely on the Right-to-Know Act's provisions
specifically providing for public access.
55. See id. § 95-174(a), (d).
56. See id. §§ 95-191(a), -192(b), -194, -195(c), -196, -197, -198, -208.
57. Id. § 95-174(f). Chemical manufacturers and distributors can qualify as employers.
58. The excluded establishments must provide the fire chief with the name and phone number
of a knowledgeable representative to contact in an emergency. Id. § 95-194(a)(i). The Right-to-
Know Act does not exclude the repair and processing areas of such establishments. Id. § 95-216.
59. Id. § 95-216.
60. Id. § 95-174(k). The Right-to-Know Act adopted the North Carolina Department of La-
bor's definition found in the Hazard Communication Standard. The Department of Labor had
adopted the federal Hazard Communication Standard by reference. See supra note 19 and accompa-
nying text. The Right-to-Know Act's definition of a hazardous chemical is thus the same as that
found in the federal standard. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c), (d)(3) (1984). However, the Act ex-
cludes hazardous substances transported in interstate commerce, products intended for personal
consumption by employees in facilities, any food and food and color additives, or drug or cosmetic as
defined in the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, distilled spirits, tobacco, untreated wood prod-
ucts, and medicine used in patient care in health facilities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-216 (1985).
61. Chemical manufacturers and importers must determine if chemicals produced or imported
are hazardous by considering available scientific evidence and by conducting scientific tests if neces-
sary. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c), (d), app. A-B (1985). Allowing "regulated parties, such as
chemical manufacturers, who possess an economic interest in avoiding such a determination" to
conduct such tests has been the target of much criticism. Susser, The OSHA Standard and State
"Right-to-Know" Laws: The Preemption Battle Continues, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 615, 621-22
(1985).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(3) (1985). A chemical is hazardous if it is listed in subpart Z of
29 C.F.R. § 1910 or the latest American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists' edition
of Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents in the Work Environment.
Id. § 1910.1200(d)(3)(i)-(iii). Also, the compilation of carcinogens or potential carcinogens con-
tained in the Annual Report on Carcinogens, which the National Toxicology Program publishes, or
findings by the International Agency for Research on Cancer can qualify a chemical as a health
hazard. See id. § 1910.1200(c).
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tional definition of hazardous or toxic are included, as well as an established
"floor" of chemicals automatically designated as hazardous. 6
3
Public access is also influenced by the type of information available under
the Act. The Act provides that "[a]ny person in North Carolina may request in
writing from the employer a list of chemicals used or stored at the facility." 64 In
response to such a request, an employer, at cost, must furnish a list that contains
all chemicals included on the Hazardous Substances list, the class of each chemi-
cal, and a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for each chemical for which an
MSDS is available and requested.65 The employer may also disclose additional
information if he or she desires.6 6
The public's right to obtain hazardous chemical information, however, is
subject to certain limitations. A person making a request must indicate his or
her name and address and must state the purpose of the request.67 If the em-
63. See NORTH CAROLINA RESEARCH COMMIsSION, supra note 36, at D-6; Comment, Mork-
ers'Right-to-Know About Chemical Hazards in the Workplace: A Proposed Model Uniform Right-to-
Know Act and a Critical Look at Cincinnati's Right-to-Know Ordinance, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 427,430-
37 (1983). This dual standard avoids the problems that arise when only the performance standard or
floor list is used. See NORTH CAROLINA RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra, at D-6 to D-8.
If the Act adopted only a floor list, it would be insufficient. Although such an adoption proba-
bly would ease the burden of a state agency or employer in determining which chemicals are hazard-
ous, it is difficult to locate a list that is neither "grossly over-inclusive nor under-inclusive." See
Comment, supra, at 432. Floor lists often have been prepared for a limited purpose. Id. at 433. For
example, OSHA Subpart Z was developed as a list of hazardous air contaminants; the list, therefore,
specifies substances determined to be hazardous only if present in sufficient concentrations in the
workplace atmosphere. Id. New York's employee right-to-know law adopts the National Institute
of Occupational Safety and Health's list of hazardous chemicals which, "by its own text, was not
intended to suggest that each of the 33,000 chemicals [listed are] hazardous." O'Reilly, Right to
Know: Cincinnati's More Righteous, Less Knowing Experiment, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 337, 358 (1983)
(table salt on NIOSH hazardous substances list). Also, if the Act adopted a list to define hazardous
chemicals, the list would have to be amended frequently as more chemicals become designated as
physical or health hazards, and controversy would arise over why certain substances were included
and others were not. See NORTH CAROLINA RESEARCH COMMIsSION, supra, at D-6.
If the Act relied solely on a performance standard to define hazardous chemicals, other
problems would arise. Because chemical manufacturers, distributors, and employers would have to
compile and analyze hazard information, an initial lag time would develop with few chemicals offi-
cially designated as hazardous. Such a delay could severely limit the availability of public informa-
tion on many hazardous materials.
By comparison, the Right-to-Know Act's hazard determination process allows for certainty by
providing a floor of substances covered, and it provides for flexibility by enabling the pool of hazard.
ous chemicals to be updated as chemicals are tested and evaluated. Information concerning a wider
variety of hazardous chemicals is thus available.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-208(a) (1985).
65. Id. The Hazardous Substances List, produced and maintained by the employer, includes a
compilation of each hazardous chemical used or stored in quantities of 55 gallons or 500 pounds or
more; the list consists of the chemical or common name, the approximate range of quantity present,
and the area in the facility where each chemical is usually stored and under what temperature and
pressure. Id. § 95-191(a).
The "class" of each chemical designates the approximate range of quantity present: Class A
includes quantities less than 55 gallons or 500 pounds; Class B includes quantities between 55 gallons
to 550 gallons, and between 550 pounds and 5000 pounds; Class C includes quantities between 550
and 5500 gallons, and between 5000 and 50,000 pounds; and Class D includes quantities greater than
5500 gallons or 50,000 pounds. Id. § 95-191(a)(l)-(3).
For a discussion of the Material Safety Data Sheets, see infra notes 113-118 and accompanying
text.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-208(a) (1985).
67. Id.
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ployer fails or refuses to provide the requested information, the individual can
make a written request that the Commissioner of Labor review the request. The
Commissioner or a representative then may conduct an investigation and make
appropriate findings.68 Pursuant to the Commissioner's findings, either the em-
ployer or the individual requesting access can pursue an administrative hear-
ing.69 If the Commissioner determines that the request is valid, the facility will
be ordered to disclose the names of all chemicals on the hazardous substance list
that are used or stored at the facility, the approximate quantity of each chemical,
and an MSDS for each chemical if available and requested by the person denied
access. 70 Any administrative order given pursuant to the hearing is subject to
judicial review. 71
The employer may interpose three defenses to public disclosure. Public ac-
cess is denied if the information requested is a hazardous substance trade secret
or if the request did not comply with the procedural requirements set forth in
the Act. 72 Access is also denied "if the employer proves that the information
has been requested directly or indirectly by, or in behalf of, a competitor of the
employer."'73 In each case the burden of proof is on the employer to establish
the defense.74
Judicial interpretations of these three employer defenses to disclosure may
greatly affect the Act's actual scope. Furthermore, interpretations of the provi-
sion that grants employers the right to condition disclosure on a commitment to
use the information only f6r the purpose stated by the requester, as well as the
provision that preempts local government ordinances that require disclosure,
may determine whether the Right-to-Know Act ultimately provides adequate
public access to information.
Under the Right-to-Know Act, an employer may successfully deny a citi-
zen's request for information about a specific chemical if the employer proves
that such information is a hazardous chemical trade secret and provides the
citizen with an MSDS for the specific chemical.75 Thus, the designation of a
specific substance as a trade secret is crucial. If the criteria for qualifying as a
trade secret are broadly construed, less information will be disclosed to the pub-
lic. Conversely, if the definition of a trade secret is narrowly construed, more
information ultimately will be made available to the public.
Not suprisingly, employers, manufacturers, and distributors desire broad
protection under the trade secret information defense. North Carolina courts
and the general assembly have long recognized trade secret protection as a valid
defense to disclosure in North Carolina. 76 This deference afforded employers
68. Id. § 95-208(b).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 95-208(a), (b).
71. Id. § 95-208(c).
72. Id. § 95-208(b).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 95-208(a), (b).
76. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. See generally Root & Blynn, Abandonment of
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
recognizes that compelling public disclosure increases the risk that a competitor
will learn vital information about the particular entity that must disclose pro-
duction or process information. 77 Chemical users, storers, and producers want
to keep information from their competitors, and trade secret protection serves
this purpose.
78
The Right-to-Know Act defines a trade secret as
any formula, plan, pattern, device, process, production information, or
compilation of information, which is not patented ... and which is
used or developed for use in the employer's business, and which gives
the employer possessing it the opportunity to obtain a competitive ad-
vantage over businesses who do not possess it, or the secrecy is certified
... as necessary for national defense purposes.
79
The chemical name and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) number of a
particular substance also can be subject to trade secret protection.80 Although
many chemical manufacturers, users, and supporters of the industry generally
Common-law Principles: The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act , 18 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 823 (1982) (compares Trade Secrets Act with common law).
77. See New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 615 (D.N.J.
1985) (mere disclosure of identity of chemical at a facility can result in disclosure of a trade secret to
competitor; it is not necessary to know the quantity of such chemical because mere presence often
constitutes the trade secret), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985); O'Reilly,
supra note 63, at 373 n.265 (records show that 85% or more of requests received by the Food and
Drug Administration for disclosure of technical information comes from "commercial entities seek-
ing information about competitors from FDA files"); Comment, supra note 63, at 441 (required
disclosure of chemical identity can seriously harm a manufacturer because it may invest large sums
of money in research and development and must rely upon trade secret protection of the chemical
identity or formulation of the product because patent protection is often impossible); Note, The
Reverse-FOIA Lawsuit: Routes to Nondisclosure after Chrysler, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 269, 294
(1980) (private industry accounts for two-thirds of Freedom of Information Act requests); Address
by Claire Boccella, Office of General Counsel for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Right-to-
Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 26-28, 1985) (real "adversary" of a facility forced to dis-
close information is the competitor, not the public).
78. As a New York judge eloquently stated:
The ingenuity to conceive an idea is a unique and precious gift. The right to protect it
is sacred. Its full development becomes the heartbeat of free enterprise. Initiative, ingenu-
ity and industry must not be discouraged nor undermined if our nation is to prosper and
our free society is to endure.
Carvel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 284, 291, 431 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1985). This provision is similar to the definitions contained
in the REsTATEMENT, in North Carolina's Trade Secrets Protection Act, and in the federal Hazard
Communication Standard. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)
(1985); RsTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). Presumably, case law interpret-
ing these sources' trade secret definitions would be helpful when determining if a hazardous chemical
trade secret exists under the Right-to-Know Act. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
In response to the United States Court of Appeals' holding in United Steelworkers v. Auchter,
763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985), OSHA has promulgated an interim rule that alters the definition of a
hazardous chemical trade secret in the Hazard Communication Standard. See 45 Fed. Reg. 48,750
(1985) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200). The interim rule attempts to clarify the designation
of trade secrets by
adopting the principles enunciated by the Restatement [of Torts], section 757, comment b,
as the criteria the Agency [OSHA] will use to evaluate an employer's substantiation of a
trade secret claim. OSHA is publishing, verbatim ... section 757, comment b (1939) in a
new appendix D to 29 CFR 1910.1200 [Hazard Communication Standard].
Id. at 48,753.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1985).
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do not object to the required disclosure of health and safety information,8 1 the
required disclosure of specific chemical identities of substances present raises
employer objections. 82 To prove that a chemical name or CAS number is a
trade secret, the Act requires employers to "establish that the identity or compo-
sition of the substance cannot be readily ascertained without undue expense by
analytical techniques, laboratory procedures, or other lawful means available to
a competitor."' 83 This reverse engineering problem presents several difficulties
for employers. 84
81. Although the chemical industry does not look favorably on disclosure of proprietary infor-
mation, it seems to recognize that health and safety information should be disclosed to the public
and that emergency planning includes public participation. See Cifelli, Chemical Companies in a
Bind, 111 FORTuNE, April 1, 1985, at 130 (1985). Many large companies have initiated programs
designed to increase public participation. See id.; Star, Hager, Cook, & Friday, America's Toxic
Tremors, 106 NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1985, at 18 (1985) (chemical industry has stepped up safety
programs, including hotline to provide information about hazardous materials).
The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has designed a program to provide guidance
in community outreach programs and emergency response preparation for its members. Address by
John Slavick, Director, Special Projects and Regional Communications, Chemical Manufacturers
Ass'n, Right-to-Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 26-28, 1985). The CMA's program should
be adopted by all CMA's members by the summer of 1986. See Star, Hager, Cook, & Friday, supra.
The goals of the CMA's program and the Community Awareness and Emergency Response
Program (CAER) are "to develop a community outreach program; provide the public with informa-
tion about chemicals manufactured or used at local plants, and [to] combine chemical plant and
community emergency response plans to create a coordinated approach to accidents." CAER Pro-
motes Chemical Awareness, CHEMECOLOGY, Oct. 1985, at 2. Likewise, the CMA created the Na-
tional Chemical Response and Information Center to "make available routine health and safety
information about chemicals to the public and to provide emergency personnel with advice and
assistance, if requested, during chemical emergencies." CMA Response Center Answers Chemical
Safety Questions, CHEMECOLOGY, Oct. 1985, at 2.
In one effort to demonstrate the industry's recognition of public concern over toxic chemicals,
the head of the National Institute for Chemical Studies, an organization established by the West
Virginia businesses concerned with the chemical industry's image, spent two weeks with a family
living next to chemical plants in Charleston, West Virginia, recording impressions of what he saw,
smelled, and tasted. Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 11, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1975). The Trade Secrets Protection Act specifies a similar
requirement for trade secret protection. See Id. § 66-152(3)a (1985) (Information not "readily ascer-
tainable through independent development or reverse engineering [analytically examining the prod-
uct to determine chemical constituents and methods of production] by persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use" can qualify as a trade secret.).
The RFSrATEMENT designates the "ease or difficulty with which the information could be prop-
erly acquired or duplicated by others" as a factor to be considered in trade secret determinations.
See R.SETATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS, supra note 79, § 757 comment b.
84. These extra requirements obviously place an additional burden on the employer. Determin-
ing when a substance cannot be readily ascertained without undue expense by techniques available to
a competitor could prove very difficult. The Right-to-Know Act provides no additional guidance or
explanation regarding this requirement. It gives no indication of what constitutes undue expense
and does not address whether the particular employer must consider all competitors, including those
with vast resources and laboratories at their disposal and those without, those competitors whose
facilities are similar to his or her own in terms of size, chemicals used, products made, operating
budgets, and those that are not, and those competitors within the limited geographic territory, and
those outside the county, state, or country. The general assembly should provide further guidance
for trade secret protection of chemical identities.
New York courts have addressed the reverse engineering problem. See Riteoff Inc. v. Contact
Indus., 43 A.D.2d 731, 350 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (secret formula for spray cleaner
held to be trade secret where formula could be ascertained by competitor only by very difficult and
detailed chemical analysis).
Reverse engineering issues present problems because the hearing or trial may have been held in
camera; consequently, if a court finds that a chemical identity is a trade secret, evidence regarding
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To qualify as a trade secret information must be known only by the em-
ployer, the employer's licensees, the employer's employees, and certain other
individuals. 85 Common knowledge does not qualify as a trade secret. The
courts may determine whether particular information constitutes common
knowledge by examining case law that interprets the definition of a trade secret
under the North Carolina Trade Secret Protection Act 86 and by examining the
Restatement of the Law of Torts.8 7 The Trade Secret Protection Act requires
that trade secret information "not [be] generally known," although "[tihe exist-
ence of a trade secret shall not be negated merely because the information com-
prising the trade secret has also been developed, used, or owned independently
by more than one person, or licensed to other persons."88 The Restatement,
using more restrictive language, states that "[m]atters of public knowledge or of
general knowledge in an industry" cannot be a trade secret.8 9 In addition, both
the Restatement and the Trade Secrets Protection Act require that the individ-
ual claiming trade secret protection must have taken reasonable measures to
maintain the secret.90 The Right-to-Know Act does not require any such pro-
tective measure, resulting in a less restrictive definition of a trade secret.
The Right-to-Know Act requires that to qualify for trade secret protection,
reverse engineering feasibility is omitted in the opinion. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Tech-
nical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 15 A.D.2d 960,
226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (court states only that evidence presented indicated that
inspection and analysis could not determine any alleged secret; thus, the opinion does not specifically
reveal the factors and evidence used by the court in its determination.).
An employer making a trade secret claim should be prepared to show in camera how the alleged
trade secret was developed, including funds spent, time spent, analytical measures used, and how
difficult it would be for a competitor to use reverse engineering to identify the chemicals used and
methodology in the production of a product.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1985).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (1985). The Trade Secrets Protection Act provides the
owner of a trade secret with a legal action against a person, business, or government agency who
without authorization discloses the information to another. Id. §§ 66-152 to -154.
87. One New York court, however, has expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of using the
RESTATEMENT'S definition of a trade secret in circumstances when the public attempts to gain ac-
cess to health and safety information because the RESTATEMENT definition, "tailored as it is to
protecting buisnesses from breach of contract and confidence by departing employees and others
under a fiduciary obligation, is ill-suited for the public law context in which Freedom of Information
Act determinations must be made." Public Citizen Health Research Group v. F.D.A., 704 F.2d
1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing McGarity and Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REV. 837, 863
(1980)).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 (1985).
89. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 79, § 757 comment b.
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)b (1985) (information must be subject to reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 79, § 757 comment b. ("sub.
stantial element of secrecy must exist," and the extent of measures taken by employer to guard
secrecy of information is a factor to be considered when determining whether given information is a
trade secret).
The measures taken to protect the secrecy need only be reasonable. See E.I. duPont deNemours
v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant precluded from using trade secret informa-
tion appropriated by hiring aerial photographer to photograph plaintiff's facility, under construc-
tion, because plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the trade secret), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1024 (1971). See generally PRACTIcING LAW INSTITUTE, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS
(1981) (discussion of trade secrets and methods by which holders can prevent disclosure, defend
trade secret claims, and obtain remedies when trade secrets are illegally disclosed).
[Vol. 641344
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
the information can only be known by the employer, employer's licensees and
employees, and "certain other individuals." 91 The Act, however, fails to define
or identify these "certain other individuals." Depending on how this provision
is interpreted, the amount of information qualifying for trade secret protection
will vary. If "certain other individuals" is interpreted to mean only those indi-
viduals entitled by the Right-to-Know Act to access to trade secret informa-
tion-emergency and medical personne 92 -then information possessed by.
more than one employer would not qualify for trade secret protection. But if
information could qualify as a trade secret despite a finding that competitors
possess such information independently, the Right-to-Know Act's definition
would seem to accord with the Restatement's and the Trade Secret Protection
Act's criteria for a trade secret. 93 "Certain other individuals" would include
those employers independently and legally possessing the trade secret informa-
tion. As more people qualify as "certain other individuals," the requirement
that information cannot be general knowledge becomes less restrictive, and the
amount of information designated as a trade secret increases.
The Right-to-Know Act requires that trade secret information must be
"used or developed for use in the employer's business" and must give the em-
ployer the opportunity to obtain a competitive advantage over employers that do
not possess such knowledge.94 An employer need not show that the trade secret
provides a competitive advantage; he or she must only show that the opportu-
nity for such an advantage exists. Therefore, an employer should be prepared to
provide documentation showing how such information benefits the employer,
the extent to which the employer would be economically damaged if such infor-
mation were denied trade secret protection, and how the trade secret affects the
production process, the product's sale price, and the product's efficacy. 95
In addition to the trade secret defense, an employer may refuse to disclose
information concerning hazardous chemicals if the request does not comply with
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1985).
92. Id. §§ 95-194(e), -194(f), -198(a), -198(b).
93. The Trade Secrets Protection Act allows for independent use by another competitor-
"[tihe existence of a trade secret shall not be negated merely because the information comprising the
trade secret has also been developed, used, or owned independently by more than one person, or
licensed to other persons." Id. § 66-152 (1985). Likewise, the RESTATEMENT states that "[i]t is not
requisite that only the proprietor of the business know [its trade secret]. Others may also know of it
independently, as, for example, when they have discovered the process or formula by independent
invention and are keeping it secret." RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS, supra note 79, § 757 com-
ment b.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-174(m) (1985). The Trade Secrets Protection Act and the RESTATE-
MENT have similar requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)a (1985) (holder derives "actual
or potential commercial value" over those not holding it); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra
note 79, § 757 comment b (information used by holder provides "an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use it"). Thus, unlike the Right-to-Know Act, the RE-
STATEMENT requires that the information be used, not just developed for use or possessed.
Alternate bills granted trade secret protection only to information that actually did provide a
competitive advantage over nonholders of the information. See S. 699, § 130A-431(a)(7), N.C. Gen.
Assembly, 1985 Sess. Such a definition places a greater burden of proof on the party claiming trade
secret protection.
95. Address by Claire Boccella, Office of General Counsel for Chemical Manufacturers Associ-
ation, Right-to-Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 26-28, 1985).
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statutory requirements. 96 Such a defense seems relatively straightforward, yet
the question remains whether substantial compliance with the request provisions
will be sufficient or whether the request must comply precisely with the statute.
The employer carries the burden of proof for this defense.97
An employer also may refuse to disclose if the person requesting informa-
tion is doing so "directly or indirectly by, or in behalf of, a competitor of the
employer."98 This defense seems unclear. When requesting disclosure, an indi-
vidual is required by the Act to identify himself or herself, and if applicable,
identify the name of the organization, partnership, or corporation he or she is
representing.99 Obviously, if a written request reveals that the person is an em-
ployee of a competitor, the employer would have a valid defense; a court could
easily determine that such a request was in behalf of a competitor. If, however,
the requester is an employee of a certain competitor, but also happens to live
next door to the employer, a legitimate reason exists for requesting information.
It is easy to imagine other troublesome scenarios: the person who makes the
request could be a spouse or relative of a competitor's employee, or he or she
could be in a union that represents the competitor's employees. The general
assembly should provide more guidance to help clarify this defense.
Another protection given to the employer that limits public access to infor-
mation lies in the employer's control over the specific nature of the request for
disclosure. The request "may include at the option of the employer, a statement
to the effect that the information will be used only for the purpose stated" by the
individual making the request. 1°° The Right-to-Know Act, however, fails to
state what purposes are permissible and what purposes entitle the employer to
deny the request. The Act also fails to specify what remedies, if any, are avail-
able to the employer if the individual receiving information discloses the infor-
mation beyond the scope of the stated purpose. If the disclosed information
were a trade secret, the employer would have an action for misappropriation. 10 1
It seems unlikely, however, that an employer would knowingly disclose a trade
secret because the Act provides that the employer can withhold such informa-
tion from disclosure.102
If the agreement regarding use of the disclosed information qualifies as an
enforceable contract, a breach of such agreement could result in a breach of
contract action. Remedies would probably be limited to reimbursement for any
economic damage suffered by the employer due to the disclosure. The Right-to-
Know Act provides for written confidentiality agreements at the employer's op-
tion between the employer and health care providers when a hazardous chemical
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-208(b) (1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 95-208(a).
100. Id.
101. See id. §§ 66-152 to -157.
Under the Trade Secrets Protection Act, motives for disclosing information are irrelevant. All
that is required is that an individual disclose a trade secret without express or implied authority or
permission. See id.; Root & Blynn, supra note 76, at 846-48.
102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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trade secret is disclosed to the health care provider for the purpose of treating
employees exposed to the hazardous chemical, and such a confidentiality agree-
ment can provide for reasonable liquidated damages. 10 3 Although the Act does
not provide for such damages in the context of the public's right-to-know, per-
haps an employer could request a similar confidentiality agreement including a
liquidated damages clause before releasing information to the public.
The Act further limits the public's access to information because it
preempts all local governments from "exercising their powers to require disclo-
sure.., of information regarding the use or storage of hazardous chemicals by
employers to any members of the public, or to any branch or agent of State or
local government in any manner other than as provided . . . ."14 If a city
desired to increase disclosure to the public beyond the disclosure required by the
Right-to-Know Act, it could not do so. Both Charlotte, North Carolina, and
Durham, North Carolina, had right-to-know ordinances that provided for
greater access to information than the Right-to-Know Act.10 5 Both cities' ordi-
nances required individuals to report lower amounts of hazardous chemicals
present.10 6 Also, the pool of chemicals regulated and available for public access
was greater than under the Right-to-Know Act. 10 7 In contrast to the Act,
which requires reporting merely a range of quantities present at a facility, the
Durham Code provided for disclosure of the yearly maximum amount of each
toxic chemical handled or used and information on any releases of disclosed
toxic materials into the air, water, sewers, or land.10 8 The definition of a trade
secret in the Durham Code was also more limited than that in the Right-to-
Know Act. 10 9 The Act's preemption provision thus limits the public's access to
hazardous chemical information in those communities that had or would have
had more liberal disclosure under their local ordinances.
This preemption of local regulations has stirred controversy. Supporters of
the preemption provision maintain that the Act provides statewide unanimity
and that varying local laws would greatly burden industry.' 0 Alternatively, the
preemption provision arguably cancels important protective measures duly en-
acted by local governments.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-198 (1985). Such agreements provided for in right-to-know legisla-
tion have been upheld. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 743 (3d Cir. 1985)
(confidentiality agreements upheld including a provision for reasonable liquidated damages).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-217 (1985).
105. CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. I, § 8-7 (1986) (preempted by the Right-to-Know Act);
DURHAM, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. III, § 1 (1985) (formerly effective May 25, 1986, but preempted by
the Right-to-Know Act).
106. See CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. II § 8-28 (1986); DURHAM, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art.
III, § 9-37 (1985).
107. See CHARLOtrE, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. II § 8-28 (1986); DURHAM, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art.
III, § 9-37 (1985).
108. See DURHAM, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. III, § 9-36 (1985).
109. Id. § 9-43 (only chemical name, trade name, common name, or CAS number can qualify as
a trade secret).
110. See Morrill, supra note 3. Similar arguments have been made at the federal level regarding
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard and its preemption of similar state laws. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 736 (3d Cir. 1985) (preemption motivated in part to
reduce regulatory burden placed on industry by multiple state laws).
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Notwithstanding the preemption provision, local governments might be
free to establish their own data base containing hazardous chemicals present in
the locality and allow public access to these compilations. The Right-to-Know
Act allows any person in North Carolina to request disclosure and receive infor-
mation. The Act, however, does not define "person." The definition of person
found in other North Carolina laws often includes units of local governments. 1I
Consequently, if a local government qualifies as a person, the local government
would be entitled to all the information that can be disclosed to an individual,
subject to the employer's request that the information be used only for the stated
purpose and subject to defenses previously described.' 12 Even if the local gov-
ernment does not qualify as a person, the statutory language seems to permit a
representative of a local government to request in writing information available
under the Act, provided that the statutory requirements are met and that the
representative discloses the name and address of the organization for which he
or she is requesting information. Arguably, a local government would be free to
establish its own data base and allow public access to its compilation.
Finally, in analyzing the Right-to-Know Act, one must examine the useful-
ness of the information provided to the public. Will the Right-to-Know Act
enable the public to receive the information that it needs to protect itself? The
Act allows the public to become aware of the presence of hazardous chemicals
used by employers and to receive health and safety information regarding such
chemicals. With this knowledge, the public presumably can take more adequate
measures to protect itself from health and safety problems. The Act assumes,
however, that the information the public receives will be accurate and up to
date. Unfortunately, this may not always be the case.
The public is entitled to receive from the employer a list of hazardous
chemicals at the facility and, for each chemical listed, the approximate quantity
present and the currently available MSDS' ' 3-the heart of the disclosure re-
quirement. An MSDS contains the name of the chemical, all hazardous ingredi-
ents, health and physical hazards, signs and symptoms of exposure, primary
routes of entry, target organs, precautions for safe handling, permissible expo-
sure levels, applicable control measures, emergency and first aid procedures, and
date of preparation and party responsible for preparation.' 1 4 Such information
must be updated within three months if new information is available. 515 How-
ever, MSDSs have generated some problems. According to some reports, cer-
tain MSDSs traditionally have not contained much health and safety
I 11. See supra note 25.
112. See supra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The Hazardous Substances List includes
only those substances designated as hazardous and that are usually stored or used at the facility in
amounts of 55 gallons or 500 pounds, whichever is greater. The Right-to-Know Act is confusing in
that it first sets out the threshold quantity of 55 gallons or 500 pounds to meet before listing on the
Hazardous Substances List is required. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-191(a) (1985). Yet in the same sec-
tion the Act designates a class for substances on the Hazardous Substances List stored at quantities
of less than 55 gallons or 500 pounds. Id. § 95-191(a)(2). These provisions do not appear consistent
or reconcilable.
114. 29 C.F.R. § 19 10.12 0 0(g) (1985).
115. Id.
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information, particularly information regarding chronic effects.' 1 6 Apparently,
small chemical manufacturers may not have the resources or staff to generate
sufficient data concerning the particular chemicals at the facility. 117 Obviously,
if an MSDS is not very informative or is incorrect, the public is unable to obtain
accurate and useful information. 118
Another problem arises because the Act's disclosure requirements are not
all inclusive. The public is not entitled to learn where hazardous chemicals are
located at the facility or the conditions of usage or storage.' 1 9 Furthermore, the
general assembly did not include any requirement to disclose information about
emissions or discharges of those hazardous chemicals into the environment if
such emissions or discharges do not contravene a standard. A right-to-know bill
in the North Carolina State Senate-the Supplemental Hazardous Substances
Emission Survey-did include such measures. The bill required employers to
report the amount of emission or discharge of any hazardous substance on the
hazardous substance list 120 and to make the report available for public access. 12 1
This provision, however, was not included in the final draft of the Right-to-
Know Act. 122
116. Address by William Bunn, M.D., J.D., M.P.H., Assistant Professor of Occupational and
Internal Medicine at Duke University Medical Center, Right-to-Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C.
(Sept. 26-28, 1985).
117. Address at Right-to-Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 26-28, 1985).
118. The Right-to-Know Act imposes a duty on "[c]hemical manufacturers and distributors [to]
provide... MSDS's to manufacturing and nonmanufacturing purchasers of hazardous chemicals in
North Carolina for each hazardous chemical purchased." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-192(a) (1985).
The Hazard Communication Standard now also has strict requirements that impose a duty on chem-
ical manufacturers and distributors to determine the hazardous properties of chemicals produced or
imported, respectively, and to produce accurate MSDSs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d), (e) (1984).
Employers have the option of either relying on MSDSs received from chemical manufacturers or
distributors or producing their own. Id. § 1910.1200(e)(2).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-208(a) (1985). Such information, however, is available to fire and
police departments. Id. § 95-191(a)(3).
120. Employers would have been required to submit to the Department of Natural Resources
and Community Development the following:
a) The total stack or point-source emissions of the hazardous substance; b) The total esti-
mated fugitive or nonpoint source of emissions of the hazardous substance; c) The total
discharge of the hazardous substance into the surface or groundwater, the treatment meth-
ods, and the raw wastewater volume and loadings; d) The total discharge of the hazardous
substance into public-owned treatment works; and (e) The quantity, and methods of dispo-
sal, of any wastes containing a hazardous substance, the methods of on-site storage,...
location[s] of the final disposal site ... and the frequency and method of transfer, including
identity of the hauler of the wastes.
S. 699, § 130A-431(a)(5), N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Session.
121. Id. § 130A-461. Other states provide that information similar to that found on the pro-
posed Supplemental Hazardous Substances Emission Survey be available to the public. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-9(d) (West Supp. 1985) (any person can request a copy of the environmental
survey); Gold, The New Right-to-Know Act, 56 PA. B.A.Q. 53, 54 (1985) (employers required to
prepare "Environmental Hazard Survey, .. . a compilation of [emission and discharge of substances]
but.., limited to information required to be submitted under other environmental reporting require-
ments," and public has access to the information).
Although now preempted by the Act, see supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text, the Dur-
ham ordinance provided for public disclosure of information on any releases of hazardous substances
into the air, water, sewer, or land. See DURHAM, N.C., CODE ch. 9, art. III, §§ 9-35(e), 9-36(a)(v)
(1985).
122. Address by Harry Payne, N.C. House of Representatives and sponsor of bill, Right-to-
Know Institute, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 26-28, 1985) (Employers were concerned with the cost of
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To illustrate the usefulness of storage information and emission data, con-
sider the following scenario: An individual living downwind and next to a
chemical manufacturer experiences shortness of breath for a few days. Believing
the facility is to blame, the individual requests and receives all the information
he or she is entitled to under the Right-to-Know Act-the list of the hazardous
chemicals, approximate amounts present, and an MSDS for each hazardous
chemical on the list. The individual can examine each MSDS and see what
chemicals produce respiratory problems by exposure through the air. The indi-
vidual could also visit a physician, show the physician the MSDSs and list of
chemicals, and ask if any of the chemicals present could cause shortness of
breath. 123 The individual could also talk to a chemist to determine which chem-
icals on the list could travel through the air. The individual, however, is not
provided with information describing the use, transfer, or storage conditions for
the chemicals that would help determine if the individual had been exposed to a
chemical. Also, information concerning emission of any chemicals into the at-
mosphere by the facility such as the chemical identity and quantity, and the
time, duration, and date of emission, are all vital information that would enable
an individual to determine if he or she has been exposed to a hazardous chemi-
cal. However, this information is usually unavailable because the Act does not
require it to be compiled or disclosed. Such situations may well leave members
of the public frustrated as they shuffle through a stack of MSDSs attempting to
determine which of the listed chemicals could have caused their specific symp-
toms or other suspected damage to the community. 124 The general assembly
should respond to this problem by enacting a discharge and emission reporting
requirement.
In conclusion, the Hazardous Chemicals Right-to-Know Act provides the
public access to information that was previously impossible or impractical to
obtain. Such information includes a list of hazardous chemicals present at a
facility, the approximate amount of each chemical, and an MSDS for each
chemical. The Act attempts to balance the public's need for information with
the chemical producer's and user's right to protect confidential business infor-
mation and trade secrets. Although such a balance is difficult to maintain, the
general assembly should consider requiring emission and discharge data to be
compiled for all chemicals on the hazardous substance list by each facility. Al-
lowing public access to this data would enable the public to acquire information
complying with such a requirement-it was feared that small businesses did not have the resources
for such testing and monitoring.).
123. Some doctors may not be able to discuss accurately signs and symptoms of exposure to
certain chemicals. Many physicians lack familiarity with toxins in the workplace and with MSDSs.
Address by William Bunn, supra note 116.
124. Interview with Charles Jeffress, supra note 41.
Employer-employee litigation involving exposure to toxic chemicals has shown that the party
claiming that such exposure caused sickness or disease must be able to identify which substances
were responsible with at least some specificity. In Klein v. Council of Chem. Ass'n, 587 F. Supp. 213
(E.D. Pa. 1984), for example, an employee sued a chemical manufacturer, alleging that exposure to
chemicals in the workplace resulted in his contracting cancer. The court held that the employee
failed to state a cause of action when he could not identify and establish his contact with the specific
chemicals alleged to have caused the cancer.
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about hazardous chemicals on site, particular substances that have been emitted
or discharged, and those chemicals to which the public has been exposed. Ac-
cess to such information is essential if the public is to understand and prepare
adequately for the consequences of a hazardous chemical leak.
JOHN L. SPILSBURY
